Introduction
When Mauritania gained independence on November 28, 1960, it stood apart from its West and North African neighbors, with the sharp division between its Arab and African populations. Two competing nationalist forces at the domestic level pulled the country into two different directions: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab World. Officially, Mauritania positioned itself as a link (trait d'union) between these regions, a status reinforced by its geography, history, and demographic composition (Balans, 1975).
Islam has played a central role in mediating this duality. As a shared faith among all Mauritanian communities and the official religion of the state, Islam has often been framed as a national unifying force, compensating for differences in language, ethnicity, and culture. The inclusion of "Islamic" in the country’s official name reflects this aspiration. Mauritania’s constitution defines its people as "Muslim, Arab, and African," an acknowledgment of the intersection between Arab and African identities through Islam.[1] Although the division between an Arabic-influenced Bidān[2] culture and an African cultural identity[3] predates colonial rule, these identities were redefined and reshaped during the colonial period, with language emerging as a key marker of identity—largely through the colonial education system that produced the country’s political elites.[4]
Yet, despite the state’s official commitment to the discourse of ‘national unity’ - which in the Mauritanian context denotes an inclusive identity encompassing both Arab and non-Arab populations - its policies have not consistently reflected this vision. Since at least 1966—just six years after independence—Mauritania’s non-Arabic-speaking communities of Haalpulaaren, Soninké, and Wolof (commonly referred to in Mauritanian intellectual discourse as Afro-Mauritanians, a term I will use hereafter for lack of a better one), have protested marginalization. Successive governments have prioritized the Arabic-speaking Bidān elite, reinforcing an Arabic-dominant national identity that sidelines the African dimension of the country’s heritage.
Language policies, citizenship rights, and political representation remain highly contested issues, driving ongoing debates over national belonging. This article traces the historical roots of these identity tensions, examining both Mauritania’s domestic politics and its international relations. It argues that the country’s post-independence political trajectory—particularly its alignment with the Arab world at the expense of its West African connections—has largely shaped internal struggles over identity during a critical period of its history. While Islam has often been and remains a potential force for national cohesion, successive governments have not always mobilized it toward that end. At the same time, Islam itself has remained a contested space, serving as both a unifying framework and a tool leveraged by both the state and its challengers.
The Mauritanian case highlights the complexities faced by frontier states straddling the Arab world and Africa in forging a unified national identity that transcends racial and ethnic divisions. Unlike pre-partition Sudan - where Arabization and Islamization were deeply intertwined, creating two irreconcilable national visions - and South Sudan, where the non-Arab community’s religious distinctiveness shapes its sociopolitical identity and perception of others, Islam in Mauritania is generally perceived as a unifying force (Deng, 2011; Tounsel, 2021). This is largely due to the country’s relatively homogeneous religious landscape, characterized by the dominance of the Maliki school of jurisprudence and deeply rooted Sufi traditions. Afro-Mauritanians and Haratin are as Muslim as their Bidān counterparts, making religion a potential bridge rather than a dividing line. I begin the essay by examining the historical trajectory of the state's management of Arabo-African relations, both domestically and internationally, and the political implications of Mauritania’s alignment with the Arab world. I then explore the role of Islam in the national project, analyzing its intersection with debates on Arabization, slavery, and national unity.
Navigating domestic and international Arabo-African relations
In the 1950s, particularly in the years leading up to independence, Mauritania’s political elites were divided over the future of the still-French colony. In this respect, Mauritania differed from some other African countries, where a strong nationalist movement was pushing for independence. Several political factions attended the historic Aleg Conference, where the country’s political future was debated and decided (El Amir, 2020).
The first group, represented by the Union Progressiste de Mauritanie, advocated for continued association with the French community and even made General De Gaulle an honorary president of the party (Baduel, 1994). A second faction, represented by the Bloc Démocratique du Gorgol, favored closer ties with West Africa, particularly the Federation of Mali, which was a short-lived alliance between Senegal and Mali dissolved in August 1960 (Baduel, 1994; Gandolfi, 1960). A third group, led by Horma Ould Babana of the Entente Mauritanienne, pushed for Mauritania’s integration into Moroccan Kingdom (El Amir, 2020). Ould Babana had served as Mauritania’s first deputy in France’s National Assembly (Moore, 1965). However, allegiance to the Fédération du Mali did not always correspond to ethnicity. As Moktar Ould Daddah, the first president of independent Mauritania, explains in his autobiography, key members of the Mauritanian National Assembly, particularly from the Bidān community and backed by traditional Bidān chiefs, entertained the idea of joining the new Federation.[5]
Mauritania, like most French colonies, was ultimately granted independence, but these political disagreements significantly influenced the country’s identity post-independence. Ould Daddah writes in his autobiography that the country could only truly succeed as a state if it embraced both its Arab and African identities, given its complex demographic composition. Mauritania, he argued, can only fulfill itself and endure by becoming an active link (trait d’union) between the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa (Daddah, 2003). Such a vision, he argued, could only be realized through a "unified Mauritania in a unified Africa," with Islam playing a central place in fostering this unity. Yet, as Ould Daddah himself acknowledged, the country found itself walking a tightrope, lacking the political and institutional capacity to fully support its proclaimed vision of national unity—one rooted in dual belonging to both Africa and the Arab world (Daddah, 2003).
Domestic Implications for looking northward
Despite its early aspirations to serve as a bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world, Mauritania faced significant challenges in fully integrating into the Arab world and joining the Arab League (Daddah, 2003). A major obstacle was Morocco, which laid claim to Mauritania until the two countries normalized relations in late 1960s. When Mauritania was admitted to the United Nations on October 27, 1961, only Tunisia among the Arab states supported the UN resolution (United Nations, 1961). Nevertheless, the Mauritanian state’s emotional attachment since the early years of independence was firmly with the Arab world, as the discussion below illustrates.
At the second annual meeting of the African and Malagasy Union (AMU) in March 1961 in Tananarive, Ould Daddah faced an embarrassing response from his counterparts after attempting to promote off-the-agenda Arab causes, such as those of Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine. By this point, Ould Dadah's affinity for the Arab world was well-known. One leader at the meeting confronted him bluntly: “You are struggling to get your country admitted to the U.N., and yet you want to antagonize your greatest supporter, France! You are disrupting our debates with these issues concerning your Arab cousins, who, by the way, support Morocco against you (Daddah, 2003, p. 246)!”
Five years later, Mauritania would withdraw from this Francophone club it had co-founded, a move that had been interpreted as part of the country's growing alignment with the Arab world. Ould Daddah was the sole leader to strongly oppose the admission of Congo-Leopoldville to the African and Malagasy Union. On the eve of the Nouakchott summit in February 1965, of what then became the Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation, Ould Daddah ordered the immediate expulsion of two special envoys sent by Moïse Tshombé of Belgian Congo, who had arrived as observers from their government. The following day, Ould Dadah’s peers sharply criticized this decision, with one remarking, "We are not in Cairo," referring to a similar 1964 incident in which Tshombé attempted to force his way into a meeting of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was sympathetic to Patrice Lumumba, placed Tshombé under surveillance until his departure (Daddah, 2003).
When the leaders of the Afro-Malagasy Union voted to admit Congo-Léopoldville during a meeting on May 26, 1965—which Mauritania did not attend—Ould Daddah responded by withdrawing Mauritania from the organization (Daddah, 2003). This decision marked a significant shift in Mauritania’s relations with its Francophone West African neighbors. Mauritania’s opposition to Congo-Léopoldville’s admission was widely interpreted as a reflection of Ould Daddah’s alignment with the Arab world, which was generally sympathetic to Lumumba and opposed to the new Congolese state.
Mauritania joined the Arab League in November 1973, a decision that Mauritanian leaders celebrated and hailed as a diplomatic success. However, the admission to the Arab League was viewed differently at the domestic level. For Afro-Mauritanians, it was seen as another step towards ‘Arabization’ and the marginalization of non-Arabic-speaking elites (Diaw, 1999). For some Bidān elites, it represented another victory in the ongoing domestic political battles over the country’s state identity. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamdi Ould Mouknas, explained the delayed entry of Mauritania into the Arab League by saying, "Colonization had integrated us into West Africa, despite our Arab culture. Arab countries were likely unaware of what Mauritania truly represented. Fortunately, all of that is in the past: today, we are an active member of the Arab League (Diaw, 1999, p. 142)." It is worth noting, though, that Mauritania’s integration in West Africa was not solely a colonial decision. Pilgrims from Chinguetti, the historical name associated of much of modern-day Mauritania, did not always find easy acceptance within the Maghreb. Two notable incidents—one in the 18th century and another in the late 19th century—underscore this contested identity. In both cases, debates arose over whether Mauritanian pilgrims were eligible to benefit from Maghrebi Islamic endowments in Mecca and Medina. Opponents argued that Chinguetti, or Mauritania, belonged not to the Maghreb, but rather to the Sudan, or what is now considered West Africa (Ash-Shinqiti, 2002, p. 432-434).
In the 1980s, under the regime of Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya (in office 1984-2005), Mauritania's international relations saw further rapprochement with the Arab world and North Africa, coupled with a growing distance from its West African neighbors. These international shifts were in tandem with significant domestic developments that marked some of the most critical stages in Arabo-African relations in the country. Aid from Arab donor countries—through the establishment of cultural centers, libraries, institutes, and scholarship, internship, and training programs primarily benefiting Arabic-speaking citizens—exacerbated intercommunal tensions (Sow, 2003). The years between 1986 and 1991 could be considered a dark period in Mauritanian history, marked by intercommunal tensions and state repression of Afro-Mauritanian communities, particularly the Haalpulaaren. These events gave rise to what is known in Mauritania's political lexicon as le passif humanitaire (in French), al-irth al-insani (in Arabic), or the "national question," referring to the social and political consequences of state-sponsored repressive policies toward Afro-Mauritanians and the challenges of addressing them.
It was in this atmosphere that the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM) was created with the goal of achieving racial equality, the end of Arabization, and a fair distribution of power between Bidān and Afro-Mauritanians (Baduel, 1994). In 1986, FLAM published the now-famous Manifeste du Négro-Mauritanien opprimé (The Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian), a political pamphlet that was highly critical of the political status quo (N’Diaye, 2017). Following its publication, several Afro-Mauritanian activists and intellectuals were arrested, tortured, and many ultimately died in prison (Jourde, 2001). An alleged coup attempt by officers linked to FLAM further exacerbated tensions, leading to widespread purges of Afro-Mauritanian civil servants from the administration, the deportation of thousands—primarily Haalpularen—to neighboring Senegal and Mali, and the execution of approximately 500 officers (Sow, 2003; Joure, 2001).
In early 1989, Ould Taya co-founded the Arab Maghreb Union (U.M.A.) alongside leaders of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. This move reinforced Mauritania’s integration into the Arab world and deepened resentment among black Mauritanians (Pazzanita, 1992). At the same time, growing domestic racial tensions, coupled with diplomatic disputes with neighboring Senegal, escalated into violent clashes between the two countries. In April 1989, border clashes in the Senegal River valley escalated into widespread violence, with riots erupting in both countries. Mauritanians in Senegal and Senegalese in Mauritania became targets of mob violence. In Mauritania, victims were not only Senegalese citizens but also Afro-Mauritanians (Pazzanita, 1992).
Another diplomatic shift, widely perceived domestically as further distancing Mauritania from its African ties, was the country’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in December 2000. As a co-founder and key member, Mauritania had played an integral role in the organization (N’Diaye, 2017). The official justification for this move was ECOWAS's plans to adopt a common currency. Following its exit, Mauritania requested that the African Union reclassify it within the North African region rather than West Africa (N’Diaye, 2017). While these moves were not reversed, Mauritania gradually improved its relations with African neighbors in the 2000s, particularly after the failure of the Maghreb Union and the ousting of Ould Taya’s long-standing regime in 2005.
Islam as a foundation for national unity in Mauritania
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania stands out as an exception in both the Sahel and Maghreb regions due to the explicit Islamic label attached to the state. Successive Mauritanian rulers have invoked this Islamic identity—albeit to varying degrees—to manage internal divisions and political rivalries. After the racial tensions of 1966 surrounding Arabization, Ould Daddah recounts in his autobiography that the government dispatched missions to various regions in an effort to ease the unrest. In one such meeting, Ould Daddah quotes a ‘wise elder’ from Gorgol:
All these matters are the concerns of young intellectuals; we, the elders, do not understand them. We, the farmers of the River Valley, have always coexisted with the Bidān [les Maures]. Sometimes, we argue over the destruction caused in our fields by their livestock or over the priority of using a water source. In such cases, we always manage to settle our disputes amicably. But most of the time, we maintain a harmonious coexistence, trading our goods and supporting one another. After all, we are brothers in Islam (Daddh, 2003, p. 353)!
As Ould Ahmed Salem argues, the designation of Mauritania as an Islamic Republic was primarily a political decision aimed at unifying an ethnically diverse country, rather than a genuine commitment by the ruling elites to the Islamization of the state (Salem, 2013). This is evident in the writings of Ould Daddah, who clarifies this point on multiple occasions in his autobiography. For instance, during a visit to Egypt to seek recognition for the newly independent nation, President Gamal Abdel Nasser questioned why Mauritania had not retained the name Chinguetti, which was well known in the Arab Mashreq. In response, Ould Daddah explained that the label Islamic Republic was deliberately chosen to reflect an essential aspect of national identity. According to Ould Daddah, this designation encapsulated the defining characteristic of the Mauritanian people, who are entirely Muslim. It is the only commonality shared by all Mauritanians, regardless of racial or ethnic differences (Daddah, 2003).
Nevertheless, it is evident that although the Islamic Republic was not initially conceived as a state project, it ultimately became a defining feature of the state. A critical juncture in this process, beyond the official designation of the country as Islamic, was the implementation of Sharia by former President Mohamed Kouna Ould Haidala in 1982. This implementation was not limited to the short-lived period of enforcing specific Islamic punishments, such as amputation for theft or flogging for adultery. Rather, it represented a broader Islamization of the legal system and the establishment of Islam as the sole legal and normative reference, a process that continues to permeate Mauritania’s legal and political framework today. Yet, despite the state's efforts to leverage Islam, it has not been an easy task to use it as a unifying force in addressing persistent racial and ethnic crises, including issues of Arabization, slavery and the marginalization of Afro-Mauritanians.
Arabization: the language of the Qur’an?
In post-independence Mauritania, debates over language became a central battleground for defining national identity, as elites sought to shape the state’s cultural orientation through education. Religion, too, was invoked as a tool to mediate the linguistic divide. In theory, Mauritania was well positioned to serve as a bridge between the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa, due to its geographical location as well as its religious education and Sufi traditions. In practice, however, balancing this dual identity at the domestic level proved challenging, particularly in the realms of education and language policy. For Arabic-speaking[6] Bidān elites who inherited the state from the French, independence represented an opportunity to assert a national culture they vaguely defined as Mauritanian, yet it was heavily shaped by Arabic language and culture. This was coupled with a desire to distance the country from colonial institutions and influences, particularly the French language. Arabization was thus framed as part of a broader decolonization effort (Bedrdine, 2014). But it was also framed in religious terms. In his autobiography, Ould Daddah justifies Arabization by highlighting the historical role of Arabic in pre-colonial Mauritania, particularly in the river valley, where it was the language of the educated Afro-Mauritanian elite. He emphasizes that Arabic was essential for religious clerics, as it provided access to religious texts and scholarly traditions. According to Ould Daddah, colonial policies deliberately distanced Afro-Mauritanian elites from Arabic, while associating it exclusively with the Bidān (Daddah, 2003). However, Arabization was met with resistance from Afro-Mauritanian elites who had benefited more from the French colonial education system, when many Bidān had shown less interest in it (N’Diaye, 2017). For Afro-Mauritanian elites, these arguments were political maneuvers designed to consolidate the influence of Arabic-speaking elites and diminish Afro-Mauritanian dominance within the administration (N’Diaye, 2017).
Bidān students educated in traditional religious schools, along with those returning from training in the Arab world—many of them aspiring to integrate into the workforce but likely excluded in the French-dominated system—played a key role in grassroots efforts for Arabization. Moustapha Ould Bedredine, a Kadihine leftist leader and former Arabic teacher who trained in Egypt for two years in 1964, recounts the mobilization for Arabization. The Arabic Teachers Syndicate, he recounted, spearheaded these efforts by rallying grassroots organizations and delegates of the Mauritanian People's Party (PPM)—the country’s only legal party at the time—across the interior (excluding the Afro-Mauritanian South). During the Party’s general assembly, representatives from each regional section reinforced the demand to designate Arabic as the official language (Bedrdine, 2014).
The catalyst for racial tensions related to language was not a radical Arabization policy but rather the introduction of Arabic as a mandatory subject alongside French in the school curriculum. However, Afro-Mauritanians who strongly opposed this measure saw it as the first step toward full Arabization. Following the education reform of January 1965, which made Arabic a mandatory subject for all secondary school students in Mauritania, all Afro-Mauritania students in Nouakchott and Rosso went on strike in protest of the new law. In addition, 19 Afro-Mauritania civil servants issued a manifesto rejecting the law and condemning the policy of bilingualism, which they saw as a deceptive betrayal designed to exclude Black citizens from state affairs (Daddah, 2003). The resulting tensions between Afro-Mauritanians and Bidān escalated into clashes, leading to at least six deaths and dozens of injuries (N’Diaye, 2017).
Successive educational reforms experimented with different models to ease tensions, including the promotion of African national languages, though these efforts were still viewed as favoring the Arabic-speaking population. On the one hand, many Afro-Mauritanians felt that the government was not genuinely committed to promoting, standardizing, or officializing their native languages. On the other hand, many Afro-Mauritanian elites saw French as a unifying force that could bridge their linguistic diversity and counter the growing Arabization efforts (Diaw, 1999).
Despite this history of tension surrounding language, the government of Mauritania has yet to establish a consensus-driven language policy. For instance, In July 2022, a law reforming education sought to address these concerns by mandating the learning of one national language at the primary level for Arabic-speaking students. However, the law was contested by some Afro-Mauritanian civil society groups, particularly due to an article mandating Arabic for all students, including those from Pulaar, Soninké, and Wolof backgrounds (Adou, 2023).
Official and quasi-official narratives often frame Arabic as the language of Islam and the Quran—implying that all Muslims should embrace it. Yet, such narratives have largely failed to convince many Afro-Mauritanian elites, who instead view them as an attempt to instrumentalize religion for political ends (N’Diaye, 2017). This is because the issue of language was tightly linked to larger debates on state identity and citizenship in post-independence Mauritania. Accepting the framing of Arabic dominance as essential to being a Muslim would have implications far beyond language itself.
Islam, Haratin, and Slavery
At the eve of independence, competition over political and cultural representation in the state was primarily between the Bidān and Afro-Mauritanian elites. However, by the late 1970s, another social group emerged with political claims—the Haratin. In the Mauritanian context, Haratin came to designate the dark-skinned population of mostly freed men and some individuals with slave-status (McDougall, 2020). The Haratin began to develop political self-awareness as a distinct social group towards the end of the 1970s (Salem, 2008).
One of the most profound historical turning points that led to the development of a Haratin social movement was the severe drought that ravaged the country between 1968 and 1972 (McDougall, 2020). The crisis led to the widespread loss of livestock—camels, sheep, and cattle—as well as the destruction of date-palm oases, which were primarily owned by the Bidān (McDougall, 2020). As a result, many slave and Haratin dependents found themselves abandoned, as their owners could no longer sustain them. Facing hardship, a large number migrated to urban centers, especially the capital Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, and Rosso (McDougall, 2020). Despite these developments, slavery persisted in both rural and urban settings. In March 1978, a group of Haratin civil servants, teachers, and intellectuals founded El Hor ("The Free" in Arabic), a movement dedicated to the emancipation, equality, dignity, and well-being of the Haratin (Salem, 2008). The organization's charter invoked both the egalitarian principles of Islam and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, denouncing the various forms of domination imposed on the Haratin (Salem, 2008). Islam was, therefore, picked by this early generation of anti-slavery activists as potential source to resist continued slavery.
The issue of the Haratin was deeply intertwined with that of slavery. In response to the growing Haratin movement, the government of Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidala (in office 1980-1984) officially abolished slavery in 1981, following consultations with the ulema, who issued a fatwa arguing that the modern practice was incompatible with Islamic law (McDougall, 2005). This decision would be backed by a 2007 decree criminalizing the practice of slavery (McDougall, 2015), but the issue continues to animate political debates in the country. While the state relied on the ulema to address slavery, later generations of anti-slavery activists used religion to challenge the very foundation of the state’s alliance with religious authority. In 2012, anti-slavery activist Biram Dah Abeid publicly burned select books of Maliki jurisprudence—texts central to Mauritania’s traditional religious education (Esseissah, 2016). Though not framed as an attack on Islam itself, the act sought to challenge religious justifications for slavery, which activists argued persisted despite its official abolition, by advocating alternative interpretations of Islam. At the same time, it asserted a competing claim to religious authority, directly contesting the state’s monopoly over religious interpretation—a monopoly historically upheld by traditional centers of Islamic scholarship, which remained under Bidān control.
Conclusion
Mauritania’s "national question" manifests in language policies, citizenship rights, and political and economic inclusion, among other areas. As I have shown, Mauritania’s rulers have navigated and shaped a history fraught with racial and ethnic tensions. The alignment with the Arab world came at the expense of the country’s position within the West African community and weakened national cohesion, as Arabization policies were met with resistance from non-Arabic-speaking communities. While Islam has frequently been viewed as a potential force for national unity, successive governments have not always harnessed it for that purpose. Meanwhile, Islam itself has remained a contested domain, functioning both as a unifying framework and as a tool manipulated by the state and its challengers.
In another work, I have argued that these tensions have roots in the colonial era. French colonialism played a significant role in shaping Mauritania’s language dynamics by reinforcing the Bidān community’s self-identification as exclusively Arab, and by disrupting Afro-Mauritanians’ historical relationship with the Arabic language (Adou, 2024). The dual education policy of the colonial period, which distinguished between the country’s African and Arab-Bidān communities—exposing the former more extensively to French education—led to a civil service dominated by Afro-Mauritanians at independence.
In this essay, I argue that both colonial and postcolonial policies have coalesced to produce Mauritania’s contemporary crises of national cohesion and unity. While colonial policies in education and language laid the groundwork for these divisions, postcolonial governments have exacerbated them through misguided nation-building strategies. What is particularly striking is that the state had opportunities to address these tensions and foster a more inclusive national identity by capitalizing on a shared religious heritage. A more multicultural approach—one that recognized and institutionalized the country’s pluralistic identity—could have laid the foundation for stronger Arabo-African relations, both for the country’s domestic politics and its international relations.
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